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Vyborg and Sortavala are two Russian municipalities situating on the border with Finland. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union they have become arenas of competition between the 
European and Russian mega-projects, which occurs at the national, regional and municipal 
levels and has at least three dimensions: political, economic and cultural. This paper traces the 
relationship between current economic development of these municipalities and their 
participation in the Russian mega-project.  
 
Russian federal and regional authorities demonstrate duality in their approaches to cross-
border interaction. This duality testifies that the Russian elite is divided into agents of pro-
European integration subordinating Russia to the EU, and those dedicated to the independent 
Russian mega-project. This contradiction results in the persistent instability of the Finnish-
Russian border regime and significantly affects development patterns of border regions.  
 
The economic crisis of the last decade has stimulated re-orientation of Northwest Russia from 
domestic to foreign markets. Export of natural resources has integrated North-western 
regional economies with the EU. Their reliance on exports has been the only possible survival 
strategy amidst the Russian turmoil of the 1990s. Now export of natural resources becomes 
part of Russia’s new geo-economic project: export earnings are to be used to finance 
internationally competitive Russian high-tech industries. This is the core idea of Russia’s 
present economic development strategy in which Vyborg and Sortavala play certain roles. 
Thus, Vyborg is set to secure Russia’s transportation independence, while Sortavala develops 
as a major spiritual centre projecting Russia’s traditional values to the Russian Northwest and 
beyond.  
   2 
1. Introduction: five Eurasian mega-projects 
 
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the USSR the new geo-
political, geo-economic and geo-cultural reality has necessitated  a profound re-
formulation of the dominating mega-projects,
1 which are being implemented on the 
Eurasian scale. The future of Russia has become one of the main problems of this 
Continent. Will Russia remain an independent subject of historical creativity or will it 
be divided or turned into an object of external manipulation? This is an open question. 
We already witness ‘a war for the Soviet legacy’. At least five ‘civilisational’ actors 
take part in this conflict: the EU, the USA, China, the Islamic World, and those who 
can be called ‘heirs of the Russian Empire’. These actors are creating a new 
geography of political, economic and cultural zones of their influence in this part of 
the world.  
 
The interests of the actors are clearly defined. The EU seeks to acquire new territories 
in the East in order to solve some of its acute demographic, cultural and economic 
problems. Facing the depletion of energy resources in the North Sea region, the EU 
needs to increase Russian exports of oil, gas and other natural resources. Russia can 
also be a source of cheap labour and a sizeable market for European goods and 
services. That is why the EU needs a predictable, stable, manageable and weak 
Russia, and a Russia with poor investment climate, which would never compete with 
the EU on the global investment market. Moreover, the EU needs Russia as its 
Eastern buffer security zone protecting the Union from illegal immigrants, as well as 
from illegal drug smuggling. These objectives can be easily discerned in the EU 
common strategy on Russia adopted in 1999.
2  
 
In order to achieve these goals the EU has actively pursued the policy of its eastward 
expansion. This expansion has followed two distinctive routes: (1) the physical 
inclusion of some East European countries into the EU and (2) skilful propaganda of 
Western values in Eurasia. For instance, in respect of Russia the EU has attempted to 
guide this country’s social, economic and political development through various kinds 
of technical assistance, trade regulations, ecological standards, civic norms, etc. Many 
of these norms and values have been in a sharp contrast with Russian traditional 
values and national interests. Nonetheless, the European project has won many 
adherents in Russia, even amongst high-ranking governmental officials and 
intellectuals struggling to prove that ‘Russia is part of Europe’.
3 As a result, Russia 
has again become deeply divided between ‘Slavophiles’ and ‘Westernisers’, just like 
it was in the 19
th century.   
 
The USA have been also very active in Eurasia. They have pursued an ambitious 
agenda involving a number of important political, economic and security aims. The 
USA seek to strengthen their global military, economic and ideological dominance 
either by direct interference in domestic affairs of ‘rogue states’ or by spreading the 
ideology of globalisation and other American ideas. Russia has not escaped this 
influence. Russian national interests clash with those of the USA in many fields 
ranging from foreign trade to preserving Russia’s sovereignty in its domestic affairs. 
                                                                 
1 A mega-project is a present development strategy of a given civilisation. The term civilisation should 
be understood in the geopolitical sense, see Huntington (1996). 
2 It is available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/russia_99.pdf 
3 See, for example, Kantor (1997).    3 
 
China has posed a different sort of challenge for Russia in the Far East. At the time of 
rapid depopulation of the sparsely populated Russian Far East (RFE), population 
density and growth rates in the neighbouring Chinese provinces have been very high. 
It is well possible to imagine such a situation when in the nearest future the almost 
empty space of the RFE can be peacefully occupied by the Chinese. Chinese 
immigrants have already occupied important positions in trade, manufacturing and 
agriculture in some of Russia’s Far Eastern provinces. Chinese corporativist social 
organisation is apparently more suitable for territorial conquest than the Russian 
presently atomised society, weakened by decades of Communist rule.  
 
The Islamic World has also played an increasingly important role in post-Soviet 
Russian affairs. Russian Islamic provinces, particularly Chechnya, Tatarstan and 
Bashkorostan, were in the focus of Moscow’s attention throughout the 1990s because 
of their strong defiance to play by the rules of the federal centre. In Chechnya the 
conflict has taken the form of an open war, while in other places it has assumed more 
subtle, but not less dangerous, forms. In fact, Russia has collided not only with a few 
independence-minded regions, but with the formidable mega-project of world-wide 
expansion of the Islamic World, equally affecting Russia and many other countries. 
Again, as in the case of Chinese migrants in the RFE, the present Russian modernised 
anti-traditionalist society can hardly withstand the impact of Islamic traditionalists.  
 
Finally, Russia’s own mega-project has been carried out by the ‘heirs of the Russian 
empire’ who aim at preserving the country as an independent subject of international 
relations on the basis of reviving its traditional culture, integrating its separated parts 
and securing full control over its territory and resources, broadly defined. Russia’s 
integration with Belorussia is one step in this direction.
4 The Russian mega-project is 
far from being nationalistic or isolationist. It can rather be called imperialistic and 
expansionist. For its implementation, common values of the Russian tradition are 
more important than ethnic origins of its participants.
5 Unfortunately, the project is 
still not formally institutionalised. It exists as an informal agreement amongst part of 
the Russian elite. Its strategy and agenda are gradually emerging from intellectual 
discourses in the contemporary Russia.
6 More importantly, this mega-project is 
supported by  the very mentality of Russian citizens brought up on the values of 
Orthodox Christianity and traditional Islam, which could not be exterminated or 
altered by decades of Communist rule with its ultra-modernist zeal.  
 
In this context the study of Russian borderlands becomes the study of the struggle 
amongst these mega-projects. Stretching along state boundaries, border areas are 
immediately exposed to competing ideologies and policies. Economic development of 
borderlands becomes one of the key fields of such competition. Regional development 
is subjected to geo-economic considerations, which significantly affect development 
patterns of border areas. This paper analyses how the EU’s and Russian mega-projects 
                                                                 
4 For instance, it has been agreed that beginning from 1
st January 2005 these countries will use a single 
currency – the Russian rouble.  
5 The Eurasianist Party and neo-Communists play leading roles in this movement (Dugin, 1997).   
6 See, for example, Clover (1999), Ingram (2001) and Tsygankov (1998).   4 
influence economic development of Russian border municipalities, taking Vyborg and 
Sortavala as case studies.
7  
 
In doing so the paper seeks to challenge the ideology of Russia’s integration with the 
EU.
8 The paper shows that the situation is more complicated. The strategic interests of 
Russia and the Union do not coincide. The most fundamental difference stems from 
their different choices between economic development and identity. It seems, 
European countries are ready to sacrifice their identities for the sake of the 
development and the mythological ‘Europeanness’, whereas for Russia its traditional 
identity has always been more important than material well-being. At present Russia 
rediscovers its roots, and this difficult process bears new tensions and divisions within 
the Russian society. This partially explains Russia’s seemingly ‘irrational’ behaviour 
and failures in building a ‘normal’ democratic capitalist state. Both Vyborg and 
Sortavala are good examples in this respect.  
 
 




The paper is divided into three sections analysing respectively the federal, regional 
and municipal levels of cross-border relations. Each of these sections looks at the 
political, economic and cultural dimensions of these relations. The paper draws on 
public media discourses, interview materials, and recent statistical data. 
 
                                                                 
7  Vyborg is situated in Leningrad Oblast’, while Sortavala  – in the Republic of Karelia, both in 
Northwest Russia bordering on Finland and the EU (see Map 1). In this paper terms ‘oblast’, ‘region’ 
and ‘province’ are used interchangeably.  
8 Surely, proponents of the integration mean only economic and cultural, not political, integration.   5 
 
2. The Russian divide: conflicting development trends 
 
2.1. Federal level 
 
Since the demise of the USSR and Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995, the Russian 
border zone along the Finnish boundary has once again become a contested area 
between the Russian and European mega-projects. The border regime has been 
significantly liberalised, and the border z one has become wide open for external 
influences, while Russian influence has declined. No more Russia’s formal control 
over this territory means that Russia is the only civilisational actor operating in this 
area and using it for its own benefit.  
 
The greatest challenge for Russia comes from the domain of ideology. Since the 
beginning of the Cold War, Russia has been exposed to intensive propaganda of 
Western norms and values.
9 In the late 1980s the most prominent political figure 
performing this task was General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail 
Gorbachev. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this propaganda has assumed new, 
more open and aggressive, forms. Especially threatening is the Western religion of 
liberalism waging a fierce war against traditional religions, particularly against the 
true (Orthodox) Christianity.
10 Nonetheless, at the same time, Gorbachev’s political 
liberalisation has given Russian people the opportunity to find the true purpose of 
Russia, not distorted by both the communist and liberal ideologies.  
 
As a result, the contemporary Russian society has become deeply divided. The choice 
is simple: either (1) Russia becomes a ‘normal’ state with lower-middle incomes, part 
of the Western civilisation and a slave of liberalism
11 or (2) it remains sovereign, 
pursues its own development path and continues to fulfil its mission as the only major 
civilisation confessing Orthodox Christianity in this world. The first and second ways 
collide with each other in the minds of Russian leaders and ordinary people, and this 
collision leads to contradicting reactions and policies. The absence of a coherent 
strategy was particularly glaring in the first half of the 1990s. However, since the 
second half of that decade, the second option has become relatively more pronounced 
than the first one.
12 Nevertheless, the contradictions have still remained.  
 
The central contradiction, equally affecting border and non-border territories of 
Russia, lies in the field of cultural policy. On the one hand, public mass media 
propagate liberalism and Western lifestyles, and the state introduces liberal 
innovations in politics, education and in many other aspects of social life. On the 
other hand, the state does not oppose the revival of the Russian Orthodox Church, and 
even in many instances provides it with various forms of state support.
13 Nonetheless, 
after the 75 years of persecution by the state, the Church is still very weak to 
                                                                 
9 It should be noted, however, that Western influence upon Russia has a very long history, which 
cannot be discounted. The struggle of the Russian and European civilisations can be traced back at least 
to the 13
th century, to the time of Teutonic Crusades to the Russian Northwest.  
10 The fact that liberalism is a religion is well-illustrated by Mozharovsky (2002).  
11 By the way, this will inevitably lead to a partition of Russia between Europe, the USA, China and the 
Islamic World. Already now different parts of Russia gravitate towards different foreign centers of 
influence.  
12 See Clover (1999) and Tsygankov (1998). 
13 See, for instance, Bacon (2002) and Verkovsky (2002).   6 
comprehensively defend Russia’s spiritual space and spiritual borders. Numerous 
social ills of modern Russia can be directly attributed to the insufficient involvement 
of the Church in social affairs, as well as to the intensive propaganda of Western 
lifestyles. Russia has  de facto almost surrendered its spiritual space to Western 
invaders. Now it is time to take this space back. Apparently, the current Russian 
leadership has gradually understood that the Orthodoxy is the core of Russian 
identity. Without the Church there will be no Russians, but only post-modern pagans 
leading a spiritless life. Hopefully, this understanding should lead to a radical change 
in Russia’s cultural policy.  
 
Moscow’s border policies have also been rather contradicting. On the one hand, the 
federal government has sought to achieve greater integration with Europe through 
liberalising the border regime, allowing the creation of Europegion Karelia, and even 
offering some opportunities for visa-free travel to Russia. On the other hand, the EU’s 
reluctance to grant similar preferences to Russian citizens and especially the eastward 
enlargement of the EU and NATO has resulted in a notable hardening of the border 
regime. Russian foreign policy has become more realistic as the leadership has come 
to a clearer understanding of Russia’s new place in the world. The principle of 
reciprocity has remained the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy.  
 
For example, two Finnish ferry companies Silja Line and Christine Cruise have 
recently become a source of Finnish-Russian conflict. They planned to run ferries 
respectively from Helsinki to St. Petersburg and from Kotka to Vyborg. According to 
the Russian Law on Entering and Leaving the Russian Federation (1996), foreign 
citizens may enter Russia visa-free for up to 3 days on board of cruise ships. However 
in August 2002 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a decision stating that 
the ferries of Silja Line and Christine Cruise cannot be regarded as cruise ships, and 
therefore, their foreign passengers must have Russian visas. As a result, the shipping 
companies have cancelled their tours to the Russian ports.
14  
 
Apparently, the Ministry strictly adheres to the principle of reciprocity: if Russian 
citizens are denied certain rights abroad, then foreign citizens must be denied the 
same rights in Russia. A similar approach was demonstrated a couple of years ago 
when Russia abolished the Vyborg Card Scheme, which allowed Finnish citizens to 
enter Russia visa-free for up to 3 days for a nominal annual fee of about 20 euros. By 
organising this scheme Russia demonstrated its readiness to open the border wider. It 
was expected that Finland should make a reciprocal step. But instead Finland joined 
the Schengen Zone, and such a step became impossible.
15 
 
Obviously, this visa policy contradicts the interests of economic development of 
border municipalities, which benefit most from substantial inflows of Finnish tourists. 
However, lesser dependence on tourism may well stimulate the development of other 
economic sectors oriented on the domestic market, which would be in line with core 
ideas of the Russian mega-project.  
 
                                                                 
14 Vil’de, Tatiana (2003), ‘Finlyandskie paromy zhdut pozitsii MID’, Delovoi Peterburg, 17 Feb.: 4.  
15  Likewise, Russia has abolished the visa-free regime for Finnish citizens travelling through the 
Saimaa Channel linking the Finnish Saimaa lake with the Gulf of Finland on the Russian territory (the 
Vyborg municipality). Now Finns need group visas to enter Russia.    7 
A similar duality can be observed in Russian economic policies. While declaring a 
liberal policy of ‘marketisation’ and integration of Russia into the global economy 
(e.g. through joining the WTO), Russian economic authorities have not hurried to 
create a favourable climate for foreign investments. Even those investment incentives 
which existed in the late Gorbachev period (e.g. tax breaks and special preferences for 
joint ventures) have been abolished immediately after the collapse of the USSR. 
Likewise, the Russian Government has opposed plans to set up free economic zones 
(FEZ) explaining that such zones represent a potential opportunity for tax evasion. 
For instance, in Northwest Russia FEZ have failed to materialise in Vyborg, 
Sortavala, Kostamuksha and Svetogorsk – the municipalities lying along the Finnish-
Russian border. More importantly, the would-be liberalisation of economic life 
contradicts the interests of Russian bureaucracy seeking to retain its full control over 
the economy. Russian bureaucrats, in fact, act as feudal rulers, thus re-creating 
Russia’s traditional forms of economic life and making it all but impossible to 
integrate Russia into the global economy.
16 This semi-autarky gives Russia time to 
consolidate its own economic mega-project.  
 
Customs regulations represent a major field of conflicting interests. On the one hand, 
Russia declares its commitment to free trade and tries to upgrade its customs service 
up to international standards. In many cases this work is done on account of European 
technical and financial resources. For instance, a number of new border-crossing 
points have been built in Vyborg, Svetogorsk and Sortavala on account of EU’s Tacis 
Programme. On the other hand, customs regulations are clearly designed to function 
as a strict border separating Russia’s economic space from the world.  
 
In general, protection of Russia’s domestic producers prevails over the ideology of 
free trade, although in some cases the Russian Government demonstrates more liberal 
approaches. For example, in 2002 the Russian Federal Customs Committee issued an 
order to close a majority of temporary border-crossing points on the Finnish border, 
which were used mainly for exporting roundwood from the Russian five-kilometer 
border zone in Karelia and Leningrad oblast’. The reason of this decision was that it 
was difficult to control timber exports going through these points. A week later, after 
a wave of protests of timber exporters, this order was cancelled with the promise to 
introduce it again at a later date.  
 
Customs duties and regulations have been an important factor affecting trade between 
Russia and Finland. On the one hand, the EU sets protective barriers against higher-
added-value Russian goods thus stimulating only Russian exports of raw materials. 
On the other hand, Russian Customs Committee often increases export duties on raw 
materials, which makes their export less profitable and sometimes even impossible. 
The ‘customs factor’ makes cross-border trade very volatile, which negatively affects 
regional economic development, particularly in such non-diversified regions as 
Karelia. Russian import tariffs have also caused serious problems. For instance, they 
effectively prevent Russian companies from importing advanced foreign technologies 
and equipment. Import regulations are often used for retaliation in trade conflicts. For 
example, in 2002 Russia introduced a ban on imports of American chickens as a 
response to US anti-dumping measures against Russian steel producers. Of course, 
                                                                 
16 This observation is characteristic of not only federal bureaucrats, but even more so of regional ones. 
See  Ericson, Richard E. (1999), The post-soviet Russian economic system: an industrial feudalism? 
SITE Working Paper No. 140 (available from http://www.hhs.se/site/research/workingpaper.htm).   8 
such policies have a direct impact on border regions actively participating in foreign 
trade as logistical centres.  
 
External economic environment has greatly contributed to Russia’s economic self-
consciousness. Double standards and anti-dumping procedures  against Russian 
producers have aptly demonstrated the real rules of the global economic game. As a 
result, Russia has ceased to follow foreign recommendations and begun to search for 
an independent endogenous way of economic development. It appears now Russian 
development strategy dwells upon the idea to revive domestic high-tech industries on 
account of proceeds from exports of natural resources.
17 Another pillar of the strategy 
is to consolidate Russian influence in the neighbouring countries of the former Soviet 
Union, particularly in Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan. Their re-union with 
Russia should have a powerful synergetic effect. Finally, Russia strives to achieve 
greater geo-political independence, first of all in the field of transportation. Thus, 
instead of continuing deliveries of Russian oil and natural gas to Europe via the Baltic 
states, Russia has begun the construction of new seaports and pipelines bypassing 
these states. Russian Northwest plays a decisive role in these plans.  
 
 
2.2. Regional level 
 
At the regional level the struggle between the European and Russian mega-projects 
has been not less acute than at the federal level. On the one hand, both Karelia and 
Leningrad oblast’ have proclaimed their interest in closer cross-border co-operation 
(CBC). They have actively participated in various EU-sponsored schemes and 
organisations. Karelia has even established a cross-border Euroregion, together with 
three Finnish provinces, in order to promote more active CBC. The Leningrad 
province has supported CBC mainly by its successful foreign investment promotion 
policies. More importantly, because of the prolonged economic crisis in Russia, the 
regional economies have re-oriented towards European markets and become 
dependent on export of natural resources. The reliance on exports was, perhaps, the 
only possible survival strategy amidst the Russian turmoil of the 1990s. This situation 
has firmly involved these regions into the sphere of European influence.  
 
However, on the other hand, Karelia and L eningrad oblast’ have continued to play 
certain roles in the Russian mega-project. Thus, Karelia has largely preserved 
domestic control over local natural resources and major enterprises, while the oblast’ 
has played an instrumental role in the construction of new sea ports securing Russia’s 
transportation independence from the EU.
18 Regional authorities in both the provinces 
have been also very active in their support to the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Moreover, since the late 1990s, particularly after the 1998 financial crisis, the regional 
economies has been increasingly re-integrated with the Russian economy as a whole. 
This re-integration has been based on inclusion of some key regional enterprises into 
the leading nation-wide financial industrial groups. For example, in Karelia the 
Kostamuksha Mining Combine has been acquired by the Severstal’ Corporation from 
Cherepovets, the leading producer and exporter of steel. Likewise, in the Sortavala 
municipality the Värtsilä Metals Plant has been purchased by the Mechel Group from 
Chelyabinsk. These cases illustrate the beginning of consolidation of the Russian 
                                                                 
17 Russian Economic Development Strategy till 2010, available at http://www2.kodeks.net 
18 These construction projects were initiated by then Governor of Leningrad oblast’ Vadim Gustov.    9 
economy, which is vitally important for the future success of the Russian mega-
project.  
 
The Leningrad province and Karelia have differed from each other in terms of their 
economic policies. The province was more liberal. This region has supported the 
development of the private sector by such measures as tax breaks and special 
investment promotion policies. The Leningrad province was greatly influenced by the 
example of the neighbouring Novgorod province, which was very successful in the 
field of investment promotion. Learning from its experience, the Leningrad province 
has also begun to apply neo-liberal and neo-institutionalist methods of inward 
investment promotion, and succeeded in doing this. 
 
The Leningrad province began its large-scale promotion programme in 1996. 
Generous tax incentives in combination with the advantageous geographical location, 
have resulted in a substantial inflow of foreign investments (Figure 1). The bulk of 
foreign money was invested in the tobacco, timber and machine-building industries. 
The United States have been the main investor in the Leningrad province. Amongst 
the most important American companies investing here are Ford (automobiles in 
Vsevolozhsk), Caterpillar (road machinery in Tosno), International Paper (paper in 
Svetogorsk) and Philip Morris (tobacco products in the Lomonosov). In 2002 the 
Leningrad province occupied the 10
th place amongst Russia’s 89 regions in terms of 
attractiveness of regional investment climate.
19 
 
Figure 1. Foreign investments, US$ million 
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In Karelia the situation has been quite the opposite. Tax rates were set at their 
maximum possible levels, and the Republican Government tightly restricted corporate 
mergers, acquisitions and restructuring programmes. The Karelian Government was 
very protective in respect of local industries and regarded external investors as a 
threat to regional political stability. The reasoning of the Government may well be 
                                                                 
19  Karelia was on the 31
st place.  Source: ‘Investment ranking of Russian regions 2001-2002’ (in 
Russian), Ekspert, 2 December, 2002: 106-107. 
   10 
understood. A radical restructuring in Karelian timber industry can increase its overall 
efficiency, but the introduction of new technologies can also lead to higher 
unemployment and social unrest with clearly distinguishable consequences for the 
current political leadership. That is why the Karelian Government has been rather 
reluctant to let the restructuring happen. Perhaps,  a certain role in preserving the 
status quo h as  also  been played by Karelian bureaucrats with their rent-seeking 
attitudes in respect of their jobs.  
 
It should be mentioned that Karelian investment image has been seriously damaged 
by a scandal with Swedish company Assi Domän, a major producer of paper products. 
In the mid-1990s this company bought the Segezha Pulp-and-Paper Mill and tried to 
upgrade its outdated equipment. However, fundamental disagreements with the 
Karelian Government over old debts and social contributions have forced Assi Domän 
to abandon this venture. Since then foreign investors have treated Karelia very 
cautiously. Nonetheless, the Segezha Mill has been subsequently acquired by a group 
of Russian investors, who have managed to revive this enterprise and even make it 
one of the most successful companies in Karelia.  
 
In sum, it can be said that the influence of the EU in Karelia and in the Leningrad 
province is very considerable, but it is counterbalanced by integrative trends within 
the Russian economy, as well as by pragmatic rent-seeking on part of regional 
bureaucrats. In comparison with Karelia the Leningrad province has advanced much 
farther on the way of European integration. However, despite its Western orientation 
in terms of both trade and investments, the province plays a key role in the projects 
aiming at achieving Russia’s transport independence. At the same time, the Republic 
of Karelia maintains an asymmetrical autarky: in terms of foreign trade it is oriented 
on the EU, while in terms of investments it remains isolated from the West.  
 
 
2.3. Municipal level: Vyborg and Sortavala 
 
Vyborg and Sortavala are similar in many respects. Both of them were built by the 
Swedes back in the Middle Ages. Both of them belonged to Finland and were ceded 
to Russia as a result of the World War II. Both of them are now situated on the 
Finnish-Russian border, and both have direct access to major waterways: Vyborg – to 
the Gulf of Finland and the Saimaa Channel, and Sortavala – to Ladoga lake, the 
largest lake in Europe which is connected to the Baltic Sea through river Neva. The 
Vyborg municipality is situated in the Northwest of the Leningrad province, while 
Sortavala occupies South-western part of the Republic of Karelia. The territory of the 
Vyborg municipality includes numerous islands in the Gulf of Finland, while 
Sortavala includes the Valaam Archipelago in Ladoga lake. 
 
Vyborg is the largest municipality in the Leningrad province with the population of 
172.8 thousand of which 78.6 thousand live in the town of Vyborg. The population of 




                                                                 
20 As of 1
st January 2002 (Peterburgkomstat, 2002: 10, 12 and Karelkomstat, 2002: 6, 9).   11 
In the 1990s both municipalities suffered a severe economic decline which was deeper 
than that in their respective regions. This is reflected in both employment and output 
figures. The situation has been particularly difficult in Sortavala, where the only large 
industrial enterprise, a wooden furniture factory, went bankrupt (Table 1). In order to 
compensate for the loss of job, many people have found jobs in the informal sector, 
which grew rapidly in the 1990s. A large share of people have resorted to subsistence 
farming. This has been typical for peripheral areas. In border areas informal economic 
activities have been centred around cross-border petty trade (also called ‘shuttle 
trade’) and illegal activities, such as prostitution and crimes against foreign visitors.  
 
Table 1. Change in the number of employees in large and medium-sized enterprises, 
percent 
  Industry  Agriculture  Construction  Other  Total 
 
Sortavala (1991-2001)  -69,0  -63,9  -58,1  -19,4  -43,3 
Vyborg (1992-2002)  -55,4  -45,4  -92,7  3,5  -33,4 
Sources: regional statistical committees 
 
Shuttle trade is well-developed in the Finnish-Russian border area. It is fuelled by a 
wide difference in personal incomes and in retail prices. Prices in Russia are much 
lower than in Finland. It is possible to name three contributing factors: (1) excise 
taxes on alcohol and tobacco products are much lower in Russia; (2) production costs 
are also lower, mostly because of cheaper labour costs and lower energy tariffs; and 
(3) copyright laws are often violated in Russia, which makes illegally produced goods 
cheaper. This situation stimulates two-way shuttle trade: Finnish citizens come to 
Russia to buy local goods, while Russians travel to Finland to sell something there, 
especially alcohol, cigarettes and music records. In addition, in Finland Russians buy 
(or even take free of charge) second-hand domestic appliances, such as TV sets, 
videos and refrigerators. These appliances are then sold at a profit in Russia. 
Apparently, this trade is supported by auxiliary services, such as wholesalers, 
specialist shops, tourist firms and transportation companies.  
 
Cross-border labour commuting also becomes an increasingly important feature of 
Finnish-Russian cross-border interaction. It is especially developed in the timber 
industry, where Russian firms often hire Finnish companies to log and export timber 
in the five-kilometer zone along the state border.
21 Likewise, an increasing number of 
Russian citizens get temporary and permanent jobs in Finland, mostly in education, 
services and in software development. Russian students and unemployed persons 
from the border regions often go to Finland in summer to work as seasonal 
agricultural workers.   
 
Subcontracting has become an increasingly important form of cross-border business 
co-operation for both  Vyborg and  Sortavala. In these municipalities subcontracting 
has been particularly developed in such industries as textiles and metal-working. 
Subcontracting has allowed foreign companies to take advantage of low labour costs 
                                                                 
21 The Karelian Government regards this situation as a problem, because the Republic does not receive 
any tax payments from these companies, which are officially tax -exempt in accordance with t he 
Finnish-Russian Treaty on Avoidance of Double Taxation (see Karelian Cross-Border Co-operation 
Programme for 2001-2006).   12 
in Russia, while, at the same time, to avoid high risks usually associated with direct 
investment projects.  
 
The municipal economies are dependent on exports of timber and pulp-and-paper 
products. In the Vyborg municipality the main enterprises operating in this sector are 
the Vyborg and Svetogorsk pulp-and-paper mills. In Sortavala a leading role is played 
by the joint Finnish-Russian company Ladenso. It also has a ferrous metal plant in 
Värtsilä and three quarries producing construction materials (stone, gravel and sand). 
Vyborg has three seaports: Vyborg, Vysotsk and Primorsk, and a relatively successful 
shipbuilding plant, formerly owned by the Norwegian Kvaerner Company.  
 
Both municipalities specialise in transportation and tourist services (hotels, 
restaurants, tourist companies), as well as have a large share of the population 
employed in agriculture (mostly involved in subsistence farming). The most difficult 
problems are  inadequate public security and negative image of the municipalities 
abroad. Thus, because of robberies often committed against Finnish tourists in 
Vyborg, several Finnish tour operators have recently declared a boycott  to this town. 
This has caused a serious economic damage to Vyborg, which hitherto visited up to 
half a million Finnish tourists per year.
22 Likewise, Sortavala has often been 
highlighted in the Finnish press as a centre of child prostitution and of illegal drug 
trade.  
 
The intensity of cross-border contacts  in Vyborg and Sortavala  is rather high. For 
instance, in 2001 Sortavala’s residents (34600 in total) made 90000 trips to Finland. 
In the Vyborg municipality the number of registered cross-border trips has reached 
one million.
23 The impact of the Finnish-Russian border is visible in statistical data on 
retail trade turnover per capita. In both Vyborg and Sortavala the turnover is well 
above the national and regional averages. Thus, in 2001 the turnover in Sortavala was 
RUR 24977 against RUR 17191 in Karelia as a whole. In Vyborg the turnover was 
RUR 25600, while in the Leningrad province it was 12984.
24 The influence of 
foreigners is also revealed in the unusually high spending on services of saunas. Thus, 
in Sortavala in 2001 per capita spending on sauna services was RUR 43.1, while the 
republican average was RUR 19.4.
25 Vyborg has developed as a major museum 
centre, thanks to its magnificent medieval castle operating as a local history museum. 
Thus, in the year 2000 the number of visits to museums per 1000 citizens was 1010 in 
Vyborg against 358 in the Leningrad province and 505 in Russia as a whole.  
 
It is possible to discern two key patterns of economic development of the Sortavla and 
Vyborg municipalities in the 1990s: the lack of foreign investments and a substantial 
inflow of domestic investments. 
 
In the early 1990s Sortavala experienced a sharp rise in foreign investment activity. 
About thirty foreign-owned companies were established in the municipality. It was a 
                                                                 
22 The boycott was cancelled on 14
th February 2003,  Delovoy Peterburg, 17 February 2003: 13 
(http://www.dp.ru) and ‘Voprosy est’, otvetov net’, Vyborgskie Vedomosti, 14 January 2003, available 
at http://info.vyborg.ru/archive/issue31/firstnews/view424.html 
23 Of course, this figure includes not only residents of Vyborg, but also travellers from outside this 
municipality. Source: http://www.rusgate.com 
24 In Russia as a whole the retail turnover per capita was RUR 21090 (Goskomstat, 2002: 481). 
25 Calculated on the basis of Karelkomstat (2002): 6, 123 and 126.    13 
time of widespread euphoria, caused by the collapse of the USSR and by relaxation of 
the border regime. Everything was seen through ‘rose eyeglasses’. But then, foreign, 
mostly Finnish, investors faced the hard reality of doing business in the unpredictable 
environment of post-Soviet Russia. It has soon become obvious that western 
approaches to entrepreneurship do not work in Karelia in general and in Sortavala in 
particular. As a result, the number of foreign companies declined to seven in 2000. 
Sortavala’s companies with FDI work predominantly in the timber-logging industry. 
Typically, Finnish companies get permissions to log timber in the near-border zone 
using their own equipment and labour force. These operations do not involve Finnish 
investments in Sortavala. A similar relationship exists in the garment industry: 
Finnish companies subcontract production of clothes to a Russian-owned company 
situating in Sortavala. Likewise, this scheme does not require foreign investments.  
 
Notable foreign investments in Sotavala have been made in the non-commercial 
sector. Thus the EU’s Tacis Programme invested in the upgrading of the Värtsilä – 
Niirala border-crossing point. Tacis also financed a substantial improvement of water 
treatment facilities in Sortavala and in neighbouring settlements. Some Tacis-
sponsored initiatives have been launched in tourism development, public healthcare 
and environment protection.  
 
It is interesting to note that the largest enterprise with foreign participation operating 
in Sortavala, the timber-logging Ladenso company with Finnish investments, is 
registered not in Sortavala, but in the neighbouring Pitkäranta municipality. Another 
major company, which will be built in this area, a large saw-mill of Stora Enso, will 
be also situated and registered in Pitkäranta, despite the fact that initially Stora Enso 
planned to build it in Sortavala. The talks about this project lasted between Stora Enso 
and the Karelian Government for almost a decade. In general,  it is not surprising to 
observe the lack of foreign investments in Sortavala, given the generally poor 
investment climate in Karelia.  
 
In Vyborg the situation with foreign investments has been similar to that in Sortavala. 
Foreign investors came to Vyborg and quickly left for other places. Thus, Ford 
Motors Company initially planned to set up its car assembly factory in Vyborg, but 
after a careful consideration preferred to locate it in Vsevolozhsk. Other major 
investment projects in the Leningrad region also bypassed Vyborg, despite its 
supposedly advantageous position along the Russian-Finnish border. Thus, a cigarette 
factory of the American Philip Morris Company has been built in the Lomonosov 
municipality, another US firm, Caterpillar, has built a plant in Tosno, while a number 
of sizeable timber-processing ventures have been established by Finnish and Swedish 
firms in the Tikhvin, Lodeinoe Pole and Podporozhie municipalities on the East of the 
Leningrad region, as well as in the Novgorod province. Another example: the 
Norwegian Kvaerner company acquired the Vyborg Shipbuilding Plant, but was 
forced to sell it a couple of years later. Among a few successful foreign investment 
projects it is possible to name only the Finnish Helkama Forste Viipuri Company 
producing refrigerators and the Svetogorsk pulp-and-paper mill, acquired by the 
American International Paper Company.
26  
                                                                 
26 Until 1997 Svetogorsk was part of the Vyborg minicipality, but then it has obtained the status of an 
independent municipality. Its population is about 15.1 thousand. It is situated on the Finnish-Russian 
border, close to the Finnish town of Imatra. According to local observers, Svetogorsk has been 
separated from Vyborg in order to free it from  negative influences of the Vyborg Administration,   14 
 
Like in Sortavala, in Vyborg a notable role has been played by the EU’s Tacis 
Programme, which has invested in construction of a number border-crossing points, 
as well as in some other public-sector projects. Nonetheless, in general it can be said 
that foreign investors have avoided Vyborg, even despite the relatively good 
investment climate in the Leningrad region.  
 
Beyond Vyborg and Sortavala, successful FDI projects in border municipalities have 
also been rare. Perhaps, the only notable success is the project of Finnish PKC Group, 
which has invested two million euros in its Karelian venture, Karkhakos Company. 
This company produces electric equipment for Volvo and Scania trucks and buses, as 
well as for Finnish firms Nokia and Wacon. This company is situated in the town of 
Kostamuksha, to the North from Sortavala. In 2003 PKC Group intends to expand the 
Karkhakos factory in order to conclude new  contracts with French Renault and 
Japanese Komatsu. As a result, the number of its employees should increase from 400 




In contrast to the so modest volume of foreign investments in border municipalities, 
Russian domestic investments in Vyborg and Sortavala have been much more 
substantial. Thus, in Sortavala domestic investments have been made mainly in 
timber-logging, wood-working and in retail trade serving cross-border tourist flows. 
The leading Sortavala’s industrial enterprise, the Värtsilä Metal Plant, has been 




Large-scale investments have been made on the Valaam Archipelago  – in 
reconstruction of the historical Valaam Monastery and in improving local 
infrastructure serving pilgrims, tourists and Valaam’s residents. The Russian 
Government has recently approved a special federal programme providing financial 
and non-financial assistance to reconstruction of the Monastery. Additional funding 
has been provided by the Valaam Pilgrimage Company, owned by the Monastery, as 
well as by numerous private sponsors. It is planned to turn Valaam into a major 
Russian ideological centre popularising Orthodox Christian values in Northwest 
Russia and beyond.  
 
In Vyborg domestic investments have been made in the traditional sectors, such as 
timber exports, retailing and catering. However, the most substantial projects have 
been carried out in the field of transport infrastructure: construction of the Primorsk 
seaport (to the South from Vyborg) and a new oil pipeline linking the port with 
existing network of Russian oil pipelines.
29 It should be noted that throughout the 
1990s Russia’s strategy in this field aimed at securing ‘transport independence’, 
which means the ability to export Russian goods directly to the West, without relying 
on services of such intermediaries as the Baltic states and Finland. In practice, this has 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
which hampered Svetogorsk’s economic development in the early 1990s (Independent Press: 16 June 
2000, http://www.pres.ru/cgi-bin/show_onetext.pl?Inc=62&offset=100). 
27 Potashev, Valeriy (2003), ‘Eshche bol’she elektroprovodki’, Ekspert Severo-Zapad, 31 March: 12.  
28 The report on Karelian economy in 2002, available at http://www.hkkk.fi/ecomon 
29 In Russia this project is known under the name: Baltic Pipeline System.   15 
led to construction of two new seaports: Primorsk and Ust’-Luga.
30 These ports allow 
Russian companies to substantially reduce their transportation costs. Thus, the cost of 
transporting oil via Primorsk is $3-4 per ton lower than through the alternative 
Ventspils port in Latvia.
 31 Moreover, the Russian Government has stimulated the use 
of the new Russian ports by reducing rail transportation tariffs for goods exported 
from these ports.  
 
At the initial stage of the Primorsk project it was planned to obtain partial  funding 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). However, the 
bank was ready to provide a loan only if the pipeline is extended to the Finnish port of 
Porvoo, thus making Porvoo a direct competitor for Primorsk.
32 This proposition has 
been declined, and the Primorsk project has been implemented on account of Russian 
money only (mostly the federal budget and OAO Transneft’ – a public company 
responsible for managing Russia’s pipeline network). The total amount of investments 
was US$ 500 million. Now the Russian Government intends to begin the second stage 
of the project in order to increase Primorsk’s oil transportation from the present 12 
million tons per year to 30 million by 2005. As a result, shipments of Russian oil 
through the Baltic states and Finland will be decreased accordingly.
33 A number of 
large Russian oil companies also intend to build an oil refinery in Primorsk. Two 
competing projects are being considered now.
34  
 
Another major recipient of domestic investments in the Vyborg municipality is the 
Vysotsk seaport. AO LUKoil, the second largest Russian oil company, has begun to 
build an oil terminal in this port at an estimated cost of US$ 300 million. It is 
designed to transport 10.75 million tons of oil and oil products annually. From 
Vysotsk Russian oil products will be shipped mainly to the USA where LUKoil owns 
a network of petrol stations.
35 
 
RAO Gazprom, the Russian monopoly producing and supplying natural gas, has 
recently launched a major transportation project together with the Finnish company 
Fortum. This project has been titled North European Gas Pipeline. The new pipeline 
will  be  supplying  natural gas from  the Russian North, via Vyborg, to Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the UK.
36 A major part of the pipeline will be laid 
on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. By constructing this pipeline Gazprom desires to 
deliver natural gas directly to Western Europe, while at present its pipelines go 
through the territories of other countries, which is less efficient economically. It is 
planned to complete construction of the pipeline by 2007. The total estimated cost of 
the project as a whole is US$ 5.7 billion. In the Vyborg municipality Gazprom intends 
to construct a gas compressing station in the Portovaya Bay.
37  
 
                                                                 
30 The latter port is situated on the Southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, in the Kingisepp municipality 
of the Leningrad province. A number of other port-related projects are also under consideration now.  
31 Ershov, Andrei (2000), ‘Primorsk stal razmennoi monetoi’, Delovoi Petersburg, 24 April: 5.  
32  Romanyuk, Roman (2000), ‘Fortum ishchet svoe mesto v proekte BTS’,  Delovoi Petersburg, 7 
August: 3. 
33 Usmanova, El’vi (2002), ‘BTS budet rasti do 2005 goda’, Delovoi Petersburg, 2 September: 38-39. 
34 Vil’de, Tat’yana (2003), ‘Neftyaniki delyat mesto v Primorske’, Delovoi Petersburg, 4 March: 3. 
35 Ershov, Andrey (2003), ‘Alekperov poslushaet obshchestvennost’, Delovoi Petersburg, 17 January: 3 
36 In addition, natural gas will be delivered to the Kaliningrad region of Russia. 
37  Ershov, Andrey (2002), ‘Lenoblast’ poluchila milliardnyi proekt’,  Delovoi Petersburg, 22 
November: 3.    16 
Finally, a major project in the Vyborg municipality could be realised by the Finnish 
state. Finland rents the Russian part of the Saimaa channel linking the Finnish Saimaa 
lake with the Gulf of Finland. The lease agreement was concluded in 1963 for 50 
years. Now Russia and Finland begin talks about concluding a new agreement for 
another 50 years, starting from 2013. If such an agreement is concluded then Finland 
intends to substantially upgrade the channel. For instance, it is planned to make it 
operational all year round, while at present it is closed during the winter season. The 
estimated cost of this project is about 170 million euros.
38 The channel functions as a 
major transport artery linking Finland and Russia. In 2001 its cargo turnover grew to 
two million tons. Finnish Stora Enso Company transporting timber products has been 
the main commercial user of the channel. In addition, about 100 thousand Finnish 
tourists visit Vyborg via the channel each year.
39  
 
In sum, it is possible to observe a peculiar pattern. Small-scale projects in traditional 
economic sectors in border municipalities are realised mainly on account of Russian 
private investments. Large-scale projects are implemented on account of Russia’s 
largest corporations supported by the Federal Government. Foreign private companies 
do not hurry to invest in border municipalities. Their involvement is limited only to 
small-scale subcontracting projects.  
 
This situation can be explained as follows.  At the small-scale level business 
opportunities are monopolised by local insiders for whom personal control over local 
resources is more important than economic development of the municipality as a 
whole. This is quite common for Russia in general, but it seems that in border 
municipalities it is particularly so. Under present circumstances (i.e. the substantial 
gap in personal incomes in Finland and Russia), openness of the border stimulates 
cross-border illegal or semi-legal ventures, which immediately fall under full control 
of well-organised criminal gangs. The possibility of fast enrichment in border 
municipalities strengthens criminal organisations in such locations. Thus, reportedly, 
in Vyborg the business community is controlled by a group of former sportsmen who 
turned into a gang providing ‘security’ services to all more-or-less important 
enterprises. They have even penetrated the municipal administration and forced it to 
privatise municipal properties at a fraction of their market price.
40  
 
Border mentality has also been greatly influenced by patriotic beliefs represented by 
military and security personnel abundant in border municipalities. The influence of 
these people in border municipalities cannot be overestimated. They control 
substantial federal financial resources and play an important role in local politics. 
More importantly, their mission – to defend Russia – is projected to the border society 
as a whole and becomes the prevailing attitude of the local populace. In this 
environment foreign investors are perceived as an unwelcome threat. In addition, for 
the Finnish-Russian case the historical legacy is also very important. Before WWII 
both Vyborg and Sortavala belonged to Finland, and n ow large-scale Finnish 
investments in these municipalities could be perceived in Russia as an attempt to 
return these areas.  
                                                                 
38 Sholmov, Konstantin (2001), ‘Finlyandiya podogreet kanal’, Delovoi Petersburg, 20 February: 6. 
39 Greenex, ‘Saimensky kanal dlya finnov ostanetsya bezvizovym’, 5
th March 2002, available at 
http://www.greenex.ru/resource.html?type=1&id=29681. 
40 Kochnov, Vyacheslav (2000), ‘Golova i mozg vyborgskogo spruta’, Novosti Leningradskoi Oblasti, 
28 June: 4.   17 
 
But there is also another side of this coin. Border municipalities are better known for 
prospective Western investors than off-border locations. However, this knowledge is 
mostly of negative character. As a result, foreign investors regard border 
municipalities as more problematic places and prefer to locate their Russian 
enterprises farther from the border.  
 
At the large-scale level the Russian Federation uses the border municipalities for 
realisation of its mega-project. The economic strategy is simple: Russia strives to 
achieve transport independence from East European countries (especially the Baltic 
states, Ukraine and Belorussia) in order (1) to reduce the costs of transportation of its 
oil and gas to Western markets and (2) to increase dependence of these countries on 
supplies of Russia’s energy resources, which should stimulate economic and political 
re-integration amongst the states of the former Soviet Union. Having alternative 
routes for delivering energy resources to the West, Russia will be able to put its 
relations with the neighbouring countries on equal footing, as well as to influence 
their economies through Russian energy tariffs. This is the real purpose of developing 
the new seaports in the Leningrad province and the new gas pipeline of Gazprom. 
 
In Sortavala the Russian mega-project realises its cultural dimension: to strengthen 
Russian ideological sovereignty by promoting Russian traditional values. It seems in 
Northwest Russia this role will be performed by the Valaam Monastery. In the 1990s 
Russia suffered a complete defeat in this field.  The Western  liberal  consumerist 
ideology has conquered minds of a substantial part of the Russian society. Western 
mass culture threatens the very existence of Russia as a truly Russian state. However, 
as it was shown above, Russian traditional culture still finds its way to the hearts of 





Vyborg and Sortavala have become arenas of competition between the European and 
Russian mega-projects, which occurs at the national, regional and municipal levels 
and has at least three dimensions: political, economic and cultural. In this context the 
roles of Vyborg and Sortavala are different. Vyborg is set to secure Russia’s 
transportation independence, while Sortavala develops as a major spiritual centre 
projecting Russia’s traditional values to the Russian Northwest and beyond.  
 
The economic crisis of the last decade has stimulated re-orientation of Northwest 
Russia from domestic to foreign markets. Export of natural resources has integrated 
North-western regional economies with the EU. Reliance on exports was the only 
possible survival strategy amidst the Russian turmoil of the 1990s. Now export of 
natural resources becomes part of Russia’s new geo-economic project: export 
earnings are to be used to finance internationally competitive Russian high-tech 
industries. The main political aim is Russia’s re-integration with countries of the 
former Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine and Belorussia. These are the core ideas of 
Russia’s present development strategy in which Vyborg and Sortavala play their 
above-mentioned roles.  
   18 
Russian federal and regional authorities demonstrate duality in their approaches to 
cross-border contacts. This duality testifies that the Russian elite is divided into agents 
of pro-European integration subordinating Russia to the EU, and those dedicated to 
the independent Russian mega-project. This contradiction results in the p ersistent 
instability of the Finnish-Russian border regime and significantly affects development 
patterns of the border regions.  
 
Finally, Russia’s widespread corruption and insider bureaucratic monopolism can be 
conceptualised as a large-scale uncoordinated grass-root sabotage of the efforts to 
integrate Russia with the West. It is the subconscious defiance to foreign ideologies, 
the desire to retain indigenous control over local resources even if this hampers 
economic development. This resistance keeps Russia semi-isolated, but still sovereign 
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